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________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
________________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), 
Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005), extends federal jurisdiction 
to “mass actions.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11).  One 
mandatory characteristic of a mass action is a proposal by 
more than one hundred persons to try their claims jointly.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).  However, cases that are 
consolidated or coordinated only for pretrial purposes are 
explicitly exempted from CAFA’s mass action provision, and 
thus are not removable.  See 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV).  The question before us on appeal is 
whether the Complaint filed by the Plaintiff-Appellees in 
state court proposed a joint trial such that their action was 
properly removed to federal court.   
Plaintiff-Appellees are a group of 113 birth control 
users affected by a packaging error on certain brands of 
Qualitest birth control pills.  These affected users filed a 
products liability action against the Defendant-Appellant 
manufacturers in Pennsylvania state court that was 
subsequently removed.  Plaintiffs now argue this removal was 
improper because they did not propose to try their claims 
jointly, but their Complaint sends mixed signals.  Weighing in 
favor of federal jurisdiction under CAFA, Plaintiffs filed a 
single complaint which joins the claims of 113 persons and 
contains numerous instances of language that indicates a 
single trial was contemplated.  Cutting against federal 
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jurisdiction, the Complaint specifies that the Plaintiffs’ 
“claims have been filed together . . . for purposes of case 
management on a mass tort basis.”  (Compl. ¶ 1; J.A. 139.)  
Plaintiffs characterize this language as seeking to limit the 
coordination of their claims to pretrial matters.  They also 
point to a motion filed in the state court requesting admission 
to the Mass Tort Program, which allegedly prevents their 
claims from being tried jointly.   
 After the District Court ordered the action be 
remanded to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
we accepted the manufacturers’ request for appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1).  Upon careful consideration, we will 
reverse the Order of the District Court and find federal 
jurisdiction to be proper under CAFA.  Importantly, we 
determine that the language Plaintiffs hold out as disclaiming 
their intent to seek a joint trial is not sufficiently definite to 
prevent removal as a mass action.  Where, as here, more than 
100 plaintiffs file a single complaint containing claims 
involving common questions of law and fact, a proposal for a 
joint trial will be presumed unless an explicit and 
unambiguous disclaimer is included.   
I. 
The consumer products liability case before us begins, 
like many others, with a recall.  A packaging error affecting a 
brand of Qualitest birth control pills was discovered in the 
wake of a consumer product complaint.  This error reversed 
the sequence of pills contained within each birth control 
package, which precipitated an unintended and less effective 
dosage program.  Eight brands of Qualitest birth control 
pills—each of which shared a common packaging process 
and were at risk for the same error—executed nationwide 
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recalls reaching more than 3.2 million blister packs of birth 
control.   
Plaintiffs, alleging that they were harmed by the 
packaging error, launched this products liability action 
against the Defendant-Appellant manufacturers of the birth 
control pills and packaging in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania.1  The Complaint alleges 
that the similarly-situated plaintiffs are residents of 28 
different states “whose claims arise out of a common set of 
operative facts . . . and which claims have been filed together 
. . . for purposes of case management on a mass tort basis.”  
(Compl. ¶ 1; J.A. 139.) 
 The Complaint contains a section devoted to “FACTS 
COMMON TO ALL COUNTS” and a “DAMAGES” section 
that divides the 113 plaintiffs into three categories based on 
their state residency.  After each count in the Complaint, 
Plaintiffs collectively “request a jury trial.”  (Compl. ¶¶ 21, 
25, 29, 37, 41; J.A. 145–50.)  In the Prayer for Relief, 
Plaintiffs, again collectively, seek “an award of damages in 
such amount to be determined at trial.”  (Compl. ¶ 41; J.A. 
150.)  Similarly, the Complaint’s Notice to Defend warns the 
manufacturers that if they fail to defend, “the case may 
proceed without you and a judgment may be entered against 
you by the court.”  (J.A. 137.)   
                                              
1 A separate action had been filed in the state of 
Georgia that was then removed to the Northern District of 
Georgia.  The district court judge denied the plaintiffs’ 
motion for class certification on November 4, 2015.  
Shepherd v. Vintage Pharm., LLC, 310 F.R.D. 691, 701 (N.D. 
Ga. 2015).  This action followed the very next day. 
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One week after filing their Complaint, Plaintiffs 
submitted a motion to assign their action to the Court of 
Common Pleas’ Mass Tort Program.  The captions of that 
motion and the accompanying memorandum in support state 
“JURY TRIAL DEMANDED.”  Before that motion was 
briefed or ruled upon, the manufacturers removed the action 
to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as a “mass action” 
under CAFA.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11).  Plaintiffs sought to 
remand the action to the Court of Common Pleas on the 
ground that they have not presented a “mass action” within 
the purview of CAFA.  The District Court held oral argument 
after receiving briefs and other material submissions.  The 
District Court ultimately granted the Motion to Remand, 
concluding that “CAFA precludes federal jurisdiction in this 
matter because Plaintiffs did not propose to try their claims 
jointly.”  Ramirez v. Vintage Pharm., LLC, No. 15-cv-6162 
(E.D. Pa. Sep. 21, 2016); (J.A. 2.)  After the manufacturers’ 
emergency motion for a stay pending appeal in the District 
Court was denied, they requested this appeal.   
II. 
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over 
the removed action under CAFA, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11).  
After the District Court ordered remand, we opted to accept 
the manufacturers’ appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1).  We 
apply plenary review to issues of subject matter jurisdiction, 
including the determination of whether to properly regard a 
case as a mass action under CAFA.  Frederico v. Home 
Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007).   
III. 
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 CAFA gives the federal courts subject matter 
jurisdiction over “mass actions,” a term that includes “any 
civil action . . . in which monetary relief claims of 100 or 
more persons are proposed to be tried jointly on the ground 
that the plaintiffs’ claims involve common questions of law or 
fact,” and which meet the specified jurisdictional amount 
requirements.  28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(i).  CAFA also 
requires that a mass action have an aggregate amount in 
controversy exceeding $5,000,000 and minimal diversity 
among parties.  Id. § 1332(d)(2), (d)(11)(A).  Importantly, 
“claims [that] have been consolidated or coordinated solely 
for pretrial proceedings” will not qualify as a mass action 
under CAFA.  Id. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV).   
 The manufacturers’ appeal rests entirely on whether 
Plaintiffs have proposed to try their claims jointly.  Id. § 
1332(d)(11)(B)(i).  In their quest for remand to the Court of 
Common Pleas, Plaintiffs insist that they made no such 
proposal for a joint trial of all 113 claims included in their 
Complaint.  The District Court agreed and granted their 
request for remand.     
 For purposes of determining whether an action 
qualifies as a mass action, a proposal for a joint trial may be 
either explicit or implicit.  Atwell v. Boston Sci. Corp., 740 
F.3d 1160, 1163 (8th Cir. 2013); In re Abbott Labs., Inc., 698 
F.3d 568, 572–73 (7th Cir. 2012).  An explicit proposal 
encompasses a clear textual request for a joint trial contained 
within the complaint, a motion, or some other filing by a 
group of plaintiffs.  An explicit proposal can also be made 
orally at some point during the litigation.  By comparison, an 
implicit proposal may be found when all of the circumstances 
of the action, including the language of the complaint and the 
structure of the action, lead to the assumption that the claims 
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will be tried jointly.  See Abbott Labs., 698 F.3d at 573 (“a 
proposal for a joint trial can be implicit, particularly where 
‘the assumption would be that a single trial was intended’” 
(quoting Koral v. Boeing Co., 628 F.3d 945, 947 (7th Cir. 
2011)).   
There are at least three explicit indications that 
Plaintiffs proposed a joint trial in this action, all of which are 
plain from the text of their initial filings.  In fact, the language 
that they chose to incorporate into their Complaint and Notice 
to Defend contains many references to a single trial.  First, 
after each count in the Complaint, Plaintiffs “respectfully 
request a jury trial”—never multiple or separate trials.  
(Compl. ¶¶ 21, 25, 29, 37, 41; J.A. 145–50.)  Next, they 
continue this singular language in their Prayer for Relief, 
which seeks “an award of damages in such amount to be 
determined at trial.”  (Compl. ¶ 41; J.A. 150.)  Finally, the 
Notice to Defend warns the manufacturers that if they fail to 
enter an appearance and file their defenses and objections to 
Plaintiffs’ claims, “a judgment” may be entered against them.  
(J.A. 137.)  Plaintiffs also specify that their “claims arise out 
of a common set of operative facts” and that these facts are 
“common to all counts.”  (Compl. ¶ 1; J.A. 139, 141–42.)  
These instances of singular language, taken together, provide 
strong evidence of a proposal for joint trial.   
The structure of Plaintiffs’ Complaint also implies that 
they have proposed to try all 113 of their claims jointly.  
Where a single complaint joins more than 100 separate claims 
involving common questions of law and fact, there is a 
presumption that those plaintiffs have implicitly proposed a 
joint trial.  See, e.g., Scimone v. Carnival Corp., 720 F.3d 
876, 881 (11th Cir. 2013) (“plaintiffs can propose a joint trial, 
. . . by naming 100 or more plaintiffs in a single complaint”); 
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Abbott Labs., 698 F.3d at 572 (“one complaint implicitly 
proposes one trial”); Koral, 628 F.3d at 947 (“[W]here a 
single complaint joins more than 100 plaintiffs’ claims 
without proposing a joint trial, . . . the assumption would be 
that a single trial was intended—one complaint, one trial, is 
the norm.”). 
Were this the end of our inquiry, we would have no 
difficulty finding that Plaintiffs had, at the very least, implied 
that they were seeking a joint trial on their claims.  However, 
Plaintiffs have included some rather ambiguous language in 
their Complaint that they argue should be read as a disclaimer 
that a joint trial had been proposed.  Specifically, the 
Complaint states that their “claims have been filed together . . 
. for purposes of case management on a mass tort basis.”  
(Compl. ¶ 1; J.A. 139.)  Because CAFA explicitly exempts 
“claims [that] have been consolidated or coordinated solely 
for pretrial proceedings,” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV), 
Plaintiffs assert that this language evinces their intent to limit 
coordination of their claims to “case management,” which 
they characterize as referring strictly to a pretrial phase of the 
litigation.  The District Court agreed that the term “case 
management” extended only to pretrial procedures and 
deadlines, and explained that “by stating the filing of their 
claims together was for case management purposes, Plaintiffs 
have . . . made their intent clear.”  Ramirez, No. 15-cv-6162; 
(J.A. 3.) 
Plaintiffs’ contention that they intentionally worded 
their Complaint to avoid proposing a joint trial of all their 
claims is constructed on a solid legal foundation.  As masters 
of their Complaint, Plaintiffs may structure their action in 
such a way that intentionally avoids removal under CAFA.  
See Scimone, 720 F.3d at 883–84.  For example, courts have 
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repeatedly held “that plaintiffs have the ability to avoid § 
1332(d)(11)(B)(i) jurisdiction by filing separate complaints 
naming less than 100 plaintiffs.”  Id. at 884. The same 
principle applies where plaintiffs “expressly seek[] to limit 
[their] request for coordination to pre-trial matters, and 
thereby align with the mass action provision’s exception for 
‘any civil action in which . . . the claims have been 
consolidated or coordinated solely for pretrial proceedings.’”  
Corber v. Xanodyne Pharm., Inc., 771 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1332(d)(11)(B)(ii)(IV)).  This principle was applied in 
Parson v. Johnson & Johnson, where the Tenth Circuit found 
that a group of plaintiffs had expressly disclaimed the 
intention to try their claims jointly when the complaint made 
clear that “[j]oinder of Plaintiffs’ claims is for the purpose of 
pretrial discovery and proceedings only and is not for trial.”  
749 F.3d 879, 888 n.3 (10th Cir. 2014).   
 In accordance with these decisions, a clear and express 
statement in the Complaint evincing an intent to limit 
coordination of claims to some subset of pretrial proceedings 
would effectively shield this action from removal under 
CAFA.  But the language Plaintiffs ultimately chose to 
include in their Complaint is far from precise or definitive 
enough to signal their intent to limit coordination to pretrial 
matters.  The phrase upon which Plaintiffs rely—that the 
“claims have been filed together . . . for purposes of case 
management on a mass tort basis”—provides no indication 
that they seek coordination only for pretrial proceedings.  
Even if Plaintiffs had included the word “only” in this 
context, we would still need to determine whether “case 
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management” does, in fact, reference only pretrial phases of 
the litigation.2   
 Despite this ambiguity, Plaintiffs contend that the 
burden of proof falls on the manufacturers, and that the 
language they have included in their Complaint is enough to 
prevent the manufacturers from satisfying that burden.  While 
the burden of proof does indeed belong to the manufacturers 
as the side seeking removal, Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 
473 (3d Cir. 2006), we hold that they have met that burden 
under these circumstances.  With the exception of the 
language regarding case management, the entirety of the 
Complaint and the Notice to Defend—the documents by 
which Plaintiffs initiated this action— contemplate a single 
joint trial.  Similarly, no effort was made to structure the 
action in a way that would preclude CAFA jurisdiction, 
which would have been as easy as filing two actions—each 
with less than 100 claims—instead of a single action with all 
113 claims.  Critically, had Plaintiffs made a definitive and 
explicit statement limiting coordination of their claims to 
pretrial matters, removal would have been prevented.  
Instead, we are left with a litany of indications that a joint 
trial was proposed and no conclusive countervailing 
indication to serve as a rebuttal.   
 Plaintiffs are provided with a great deal of power in 
the CAFA removal context.  They have the ability to 
                                              
2 Notably, a Court of Common Pleas local rule 
indicates that “case management” can encompass trial 
management.  See Pa. Ct. C.P. Phila. Civ. R. 215(A)(2) (“All 
jury cases . . . shall be listed for trial . . . in accordance with 
the pertinent Case Management Order.”). 
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effectively insulate themselves from CAFA jurisdiction 
simply by taking the correct steps in structuring their action.  
Plaintiffs must carefully consider how they craft their 
complaints and other initial filings, and any intentional efforts 
to avoid CAFA jurisdiction should be clear and unambiguous.  
Where they opt to file a single complaint containing the 
claims of more than 100 plaintiffs, they must be even more 
explicit to overcome the presumption that those claims will be 
tried jointly.  This is especially true where, as in 
Pennsylvania, the state’s permissive joinder rules explicitly 
presume that persons who join as plaintiffs in a single action 
based upon a common question of fact or law will have their 
claims tried jointly.  Pa. R. Civ. P. 2229, 2231(c); see also 
Bullard v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., 535 F.3d 759, 762 
(7th Cir. 2008) (examining how Illinois procedural rules treat 
joined claims).  Ultimately, plaintiffs bear the burden of 
clarity in this context.   
IV. 
Plaintiffs also put forth a non-textual argument 
asserting that their motion for admission to the Mass Tort 
Program is evidence of their intent to try their claims 
separately.  Plaintiffs’ conduct undertaken after filing the 
Complaint is certainly relevant, as long as that conduct 
occurred prior to removal.3  See Scimone, 720 F.3d at 881 
(“what is clear from [CAFA’s] text and structure is that the 
                                              
3 Of course, we ordinarily examine the case at the time 
the complaint was filed, see Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. 
Knowles, 133 S. Ct. 1345, 1349 (2013), unless subsequent 
developments are what triggered removal, see 28 U.S.C. § 
1446(b)(3).  Such is not the case here. 
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plaintiffs can propose a joint trial, either by naming 100 or 
more plaintiffs in a single complaint or by their litigation 
conduct at any time prior to defendants’ removal of their 
action to federal court”).  Even so, the face of the Complaint 
and the structure of the action are the best indicators of 
whether a joint trial is being sought.  A group of plaintiffs 
may implicitly or explicitly propose a joint trial later in the 
litigation; however, a group of plaintiffs cannot similarly file 
a complaint that explicitly or implicitly proposes a joint trial, 
only to then rely on their later conduct as evidence that they 
had not initially made such a proposal.  Applying this 
principle, Plaintiffs’ motion for admission to the Mass Tort 
Program cannot save them from removal—regardless of its 
content or effect—where the structure of their action and 
initial filings imply a proposal for a joint trial.   
But even if we suspend this principle, Plaintiffs’ 
motion and potential admission to the Mass Tort Program do 
not evince an intention that their claims be tried separately.  
Their reliance on admission to the Mass Tort Program to 
prove their intent to try the claims separately hinges on their 
assertion that they would be unable to try their claims jointly 
under the rules of the program.  See In re: Mass TORT and 
Asbestos Programs, General Court Reg. No. 2012-01, 2011 
WL 8771684 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2011) (“Trial Order”).  Intent is 
certainly pertinent to determining whether Plaintiffs have 
proposed a joint trial.  See Parson, 749 F.3d at 888 (“[T]he 
common usage of the word ‘propose’ involves an intentional 
act.”); Scimone, 720 F.3d at 884 (“The more natural reading 
of the [mass action] provision is that the plaintiffs must 
actually want, or at least intend to bring about, what they are 
proposing.”).  And a proposal for a joint trial cannot be made 
to a court that is unable to effectuate a joint trial under the 
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circumstances.  Briggs v. Merck Sharpe & Dohme, 796 F.3d 
1038, 1048 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[I]f a court lacks the authority to 
grant a request for a joint trial, then plaintiffs cannot 
‘propose’ a joint trial by making a request to that court.”).  
But the Mass Tort Program does not necessarily prevent 
Plaintiffs from trying their claims in a fashion that would 
constitute a “joint trial.”   
The Trial Order governing the Mass Tort Program, at 
least for asbestos cases, does not permit cases involving the 
application of law from different states to be tried together, 
and it also limits the number of cases that can be jointly tried.  
In re: Mass TORT and Asbestos Programs, 2011 WL 
8771684.  Comparatively, Plaintiffs’ Complaint presents 113 
claims with plaintiffs from 28 different states.  They 
emphasize that they divided the damages portion of their 
Complaint into three categories to account for the various 
state laws at play.  But a joint trial can take a variety of other 
forms that would not be precluded by acceptance into the 
Mass Tort Program.  The Seventh Circuit has succinctly 
explained that a joint trial may exist even where less than 100 
claims have proceeded to trial or where issue preclusion 
might extend to the other claims that have yet to be tried: 
[A] joint trial does not have to encompass relief.  
For example, a trial on liability could be limited 
to a few plaintiffs, after which a separate trial 
on damages could be held.  Similarly, we have 
said that a trial that involved only “10 
exemplary plaintiffs, followed by application of 
issue or claim preclusion to 134 more plaintiffs 
without another trial, is one in which the claims 
of 100 or more persons are being tried jointly.”  
In short, a joint trial can take different forms as 
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long as the plaintiffs' claims are being 
determined jointly. 
Abbott Labs., 698 F.3d at 573 (citations omitted).   
Several circuits have also held that a “bellwether trial”4 
is a form of a joint trial.  See, e.g., Atwell, 740 F.3d at 1165–
66; but cf. Briggs, 796 F.3d at 1051 (“a bellwether trial is not, 
without more, a joint trial within the meaning of CAFA”).  
Bellwether trials appear to be contemplated under the Mass 
Tort Program, which is consistent with the way most states 
treat mass tort cases.  Moreover, while Plaintiffs have divided 
their damage claims into categories by state, they make no 
such differentiation in terms of liability.  Thus, a decision at 
trial regarding the manufacturers’ liability may well be 
preclusive as to all of Plaintiffs’ claims, even if tried in a 
group the size of those permitted under the Mass Tort 
Program.  See Abbott Labs., 698 F.3d at 573 (a joint trial may 
exist where “a trial on liability [is] limited to a few plaintiffs” 
and is followed by “a separate trial on damages”).  Such a 
sequence of events would be regarded as a joint trial, and 
because a joint trial is still possible under the rules of the 
Mass Tort Program, we do not find Plaintiffs’ motion for 
admission to that program to evince an intent to try their 
claims separately.   
                                              
4 “A bellwether trial is a test case that is typically used 
to facilitate settlement in similar cases by demonstrating the 
likely value of a claim or by aiding in predicting the outcome 
of tricky questions of causation or liability.”  Briggs, 796 F.3d 
at 1051. 
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V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, the District Court’s Order 
dated September 21, 2016, remanding this matter to the Court 
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County will be reversed 
and this matter will be remanded to the District Court for 
further proceedings. 
